Companies created to pass-off as banks

We’ve noticed several companies with names designed to pass themselves off as connected to genuine banks. Often the tell is that the directors, whose names are similar or identical to real officers of real banks, have the wrong month/year of birth.

All of these share a registered office:

BANQUE DE AMÉRIQUE SINGAPOUR LIMITED

(a pass-off of Bank of America, Singapore branch)

BANQUE MORGAN STANLEY AG LIMITED

(a pass-off of Morgan Stanley)

BANQUE DE TOKYO- MITSUBISHI UFJ LTD.

(a pass-off of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi)

BANQUE POPULAIRE DE CHINE LTD

(a pass-off of The People’s Bank of China)

AGRICOLE BANQUE DE CHINE LIMITED

(a pass-off of Agricultural Bank of China)

BANQUE CANTONALE DE GENÈVE LTD (formerly HSBC BANQUE (CHINE) CO. LIMITED)

DEUTSCHE BANQUE AG LTD

(a pass-off of Deutsche Bank)

INDUSTRIEL ET COMMERCIAL BANQUE DE CHINE LIMITED

(a pass-off of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China)

Then there are these 2 with shared registered office. The first has officers with Chinese names in the Ukraine and is a pass-off of Bank of Communications Co., Ltd. of China:
BANQUE DE COMMUNICATIONS CO. LTD.

BANQUE DE BRESIL SA LTD

Fascinating and very well spotted!

We can add a little more flesh about the registered addresses involved. Both house, but not exclusively, formation agents that provide Corporate Secretarial services to a very substantial number of companies.

The issue you have raised here has common ground with your post The need for better identifiers - discuss! and also my series (probably not yet concluded) about POTENTIALLY FICTICIOUS ADDRESS and / or PERSON(S).

There is, in our view, clear evidence of malicious intent in each example exposed and of the need for a policing effort to minimise the scope for harm. I am sure that this is outside the Companies House remit but when suspicions are raised by designated bulk users perhaps the CH Integrity Team could review / accept the suspicion rationale and then error names so these revert to number and error addresses to the appropriate CH default address until such time as the suspicion is removed or default compliance procedures result in dissolution.

Could this be a plan to stamp on clear malicious intent?

Can it be improved on?

Can and will CH implement it within their existing powers and resources?

Discussion would be welcomed and improvements / CH prompt action welcomed.

(frank@statbooks.co.uk for those who want to keep discussion out of the public domain.)